FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Randy M. Hendershot, Office of U.S. Atty., Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.
William K. Rork, Rork Law Office, Topeka, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROGERS, District Judge.
*1 On April 23, 1997, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of aggravated bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) and 2; use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2; and conspiracy to commit aggravated bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Following the verdicts, the government sought detention of the defendant pending sentencing pursuant to the provisions of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. The court ordered that the defendant be detained. The defendant now seeks reconsideration of that order. The defendant contends that the court was confused in its determination. Finding no confusion or basis for reconsideration, the court shall deny the defendant's motion.
The Bail Reform Act sets forth the procedures by which the court determines whether a recently convicted person may be released pending sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a), 3145(c). A defendant convicted of a crime of violence may qualify for release in two ways. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a)(2), 3142(f)(1)(A), 3145(c); see also United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 805-06 (10th Cir.1992). In either case, there is a presumption of detention. Here, there is no question that the defendant was convicted of crimes of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4); see also United States v. Daidone, 796 F.Supp. 715, 721 (E.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd without pub.op., 999 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.1993).
Under section 3143(a)(2), such a defendant "shall ... be detained" unless the judicial officer finds (1) "a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted" and (2) "by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a)(2), 3143(a)(2)(A)(i), 3143(a) (2)(B). Both subsections must be satisfied in order to warrant release. United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 73 n. 1 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1125, 114 S.Ct. 1086, 127 L.Ed.2d 401 (1994).
Alternatively, under section 3145(c), "[a] person subject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) ..., and who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) ..., may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person's detention would not be appropriate." Section 3143(a)(1) requires that "the judicial officer find [ ] by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).
In short, to warrant release under section 3145(c), a defendant must meet two requirements. First, he must satisfy section 3143(a)(1). Second, he must proffer "exceptional reasons why detention would not be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).
The court is unable to find any basis for release under either section 3143(a)(2) or section 3145(c). Under the requirements of section 3143(a)(2), the court notes initially that the defendant has not demonstrated that there is a "substantial likelihood" that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted. Moreover, the court is not persuaded that the defendant has produced "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a threat to any person or the community or that he is not likely to flee. The defendant contends that nothing has changed since he was released by the magistrate pending trial of this case. The court disagrees. Much has changed. The defendant has now been convicted of three serious crimes and faces a substantial period of incarceration. Moreover, the court has heard evidence during the course of the trial that the defendants agreed to "kill" anyone who "snitched" on them. These circumstances suggest that detention under section 3143(a)(2) is now appropriate.
*2 Finally, the court cannot think of any "exceptional reasons" why detention would not be appropriate. The defendant has not suggested any, and the court is unaware of any such reasons. Accordingly, the court finds no basis for reconsideration of its order of detention pending sentencing of April 24, 1997.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion for reconsideration (Doc. # 124) be hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
D.Kan.,1997.
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. (C) West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works